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In this study, I examine whether it is possible to predict future financial statement fraud 
using disclosure content prior to the fraud. Specifically, I employ a machine learning algorithm to 
construct a unique measure based on the lexical cues embedded within a firm’s first public 
disclosure, the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the S-1 filing, during the Initial 
Public Offering process. I use this measure to predict whether a firm that is not already committing 
fraud will commit fraud within five years of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) that results in an 
Accounting or Enforcement Release (AAER). I find there is information within the S-1 filing that 
is useful in the prediction of out-of-sample fraud. Additionally, I find that the measure performs 
better than both benchmark measures from prior literature and a new measure using quantitative 
information, when using information available at the S-1 date. Furthermore, the lexical cues 
measure performs well in predicting fraud relative to the benchmark measures even after updating 
the benchmark measures with misstated annual filings to aid their (but not my measure’s) fraud 
detection abilities. I find that my new measure is not limited to only predicting AAER based 
misconduct, but that the out-of-sample results hold when using an alternate sample based on 10(b)-
5 filings as well as a comprehensive set of quantitative variables. Lastly, my measure identifies 
firms more likely to manage earnings to meet/beat analyst forecasts, firms who experience higher 
levels of information asymmetry around earnings announcements within the five years following 
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In this study I examine whether it is possible to identify fraud using the nuances of textual 
disclosure in corporate filings prior to the fraud. Financial statement fraud is a threat to the 
efficiency of capital markets as it impairs the trust between corporations and capital market 
participants (Amiram et al. 2018). The implications of fraud range from reducing the usefulness 
and value relevance of financial reporting to creating large scale losses of $74-$180 billion dollars 
in shareholder value if left unchecked (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; 
American 2016). Therefore, the timely identification of fraud is beneficial to investors and 
regulators in that it likely preserves a significant amount of investor capital. A large body of 
literature identifies or predicts instances where financial statement fraud is presently occurring, as 
opposed to identifying instances in which fraud is likely to occur in the future (Cecchini et al. 
2010; Dechow et al. 2011; Larcker and Zakolyukina 2012; Purda and Skillicorn 2015; Hoberg and 
Lewis 2017). Even the most recent studies focus on the actual manipulated financial statements 
(or other disclosures) during the SEC-identified manipulation period without considering the pre-
manipulation financial statements as a standalone information source  (Bao et al. 2020; Brown et 
al. 2020).1 My study differs from prior research by examining whether there is information content 
in pre-fraud disclosure indicative of a higher likelihood of future fraud, enabling investors to make 
alternative investment decisions at an earlier point in time and providing regulators with an 
opportunity to increase monitoring on firms with the greatest likelihood of future misconduct.  
 
1 The identified manipulation period refers to the period named by the SEC in the applicable Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Release. While not all financial statement manipulation events are investigated and therefore 
some remain undetected, I follow prior literature and consider the periods identified as manipulation periods 
compared with non-manipulation-periods for the purposes of this study, consistent with prior literature (Dechow et 
al. 2011; Bao et al. 2020; Brown et al. 2020). 
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The ability to identify fraud-firms prior to their fraud is important for several reasons. First, 
as enforcement and regulatory monitors, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
are subject to resource constraints, it enables them to maximize their limited resources and 
potentially prevent the occurrence of fraud (Bao et al. 2020). Furthermore, targeted monitoring has 
the potential to limit the extent of the impact of financial manipulation on investors and the period 
over which financial statements are manipulated. Second, providing internal monitors (i.e., boards) 
with a list of attributes associated with future manipulation likelihood enables them to watch for 
and potentially limit the extent of fraud within their own organization. Additionally, the timely 
detection or prevention of fraud preserves investor capital as firms suffer negative returns when 
financial statements are restated and investigated for financial misconduct (Palmrose et al. 2004; 
Karpoff et al. 2008; Gande and Lewis 2009).  
In order to provide a timelier assessment of fraud risk, I examine the qualitative content in 
the earliest public firm disclosure of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) process: the initial S-1 filing. 
I use this setting for three reasons. First, the IPO period is a time when the firm is heavily 
monitored, potentially constraining firms who may otherwise manipulate their disclosures 
(Stoughton and Zechner 1998; Ritter and Welch 2002, Hanley and Hoberg 2012). Therefore, the 
IPO setting provides the opportunity to examine how a firm responds to pressure in a high-stakes 
firm disclosure environment (Hughes and Thakor 1992; Drake and Vetsuypens 1993; Lowry and 
Shu 2002), while still being subject to high levels of monitoring.  
 Second, the initial S-1 filing is the first public disclosure event for the firm, therefore the 
filing has not yet gone through an amendment process, allowing for more nuanced linguistic cues 
to be potentially embedded within the filing (Hanley and Hoberg 2012). I focus on a linguistic-
based approach as opposed to using quantitative financial information as my research question 
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posits the relevant information content will consist of subtle nuances or cues contained within the 
textual firm disclosures (Loughran and McDonald 2016). Additionally, prior literature finds that 
IPO-firms lack a history of tangible information (i.e., past positive earnings streams, revenues, or 
even dividends), and therefore many studies analyze the qualitative content of the S-1 and find it 
to be incrementally informative (Hanley and Hoberg 2010; Arnold et al. 2010; Ferris et al. 2013; 
Loughran and McDonald 2013; Brau et al. 2016).  
To examine the nuanced ways in which written communication is indicative of future 
fraud, I create a novel measure, fraud_cues, using the Management’s Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A) section of the initial S-1 filing. Hanley 
and Hoberg (2010) demonstrate the informativeness of the MD&A section, finding this section 
has the highest absolute value of residuals from a regression estimating standard content (Hanley 
and Hoberg 2010). Using the content of S-1 filings taken from EDGAR, I employ a machine 
learning approach using a support vector machine (SVM) to create fraud_cues. Specifically, I 
utilize a “text classifier” machine learning model that employs a deep learning layer within the 
vectorization stage. I use this SVM approach for several reasons. First, the advantage of using deep 
learning vectorization in this setting is the ability to collectively examine sentence construction, 
word co-location, and individual word choice to classify the text vectors based on relevancy (Guo 
et al. 2016). Thus, fraud_cues does not limit classification to a pre-identified bag-of-words and 
allows for a nuanced analysis of the information content within the MD&A of the S-1 filing.2  
Second, popular press has posited that sophisticated investors are basing investment 
decisions on charismatic language intended to mislead investors as opposed to firm fundamentals 
 
2 A key limitation to using a “bag-of-words” approach is that even when using n-grams the method does not capture 




(Galloway 2019). SVM performs the data transformations necessary to discern whether nuanced 
information (e.g., charismatic language) can be used to identify firms as future-fraud firms. Third, 
this approach utilizes publicly available financial statement information and can therefore be 
replicated, which has been cited as a challenge by prior textual analysis literature (Loughran and 
McDonald 2016).   
I first evaluate the validity of my measure by showing that fraud_cues has high within-
sample detection of financial manipulation. In additional analyses, I show that my measure is not 
simply identifying underpricing in the IPO period or directly proxying for a “bag-of-words” 
approach.  Further analyses assess the usefulness of fraud_cues in identifying future fraud firms 
out-of-sample. I compare the performance of my measure against four financial statement fraud 
prediction measures from the literature and one new measure. As there are currently no studies 
that examine the independent information content within pre-manipulation period disclosure, I 
compare my measure with the most similar available measures from prior literature in order to 
provide context for the predictive accuracy of my model. Namely, I compare my approach to the 
Dechow et al. (2011) f-score, the Bao et al. (2020) raw ensemble method RUSBoost, the Hoberg 
and Lewis (2017) measure of abnormal disclosure, and the Brown et al. (2020) topic analysis 
measure. I also create a new measure, IPO_f-score, using a set of quantitative variables likely 
associated with pre-fraud firms. The primary difference between my measure and the benchmark 
measures is they all utilize manipulation-period disclosures in their original construction and 
therefore predict the likelihood that a manipulation is presently occurring.3 I compare my measure 
to the benchmark measures both at the time of the IPO and again at the time of the first 
 
3 While I acknowledge using these measures in a setting for which they were not intended is subject to limitations, 
they provide evidence that my measure is not subsumed by pre-existing fraud prediction measures. 
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misstatement to determine how my measure of the likelihood of future financial manipulation 
compares to extant measures of current financial manipulation.  
I find the out-of-sample performance results for my measure, fraud_cues, are significantly 
better than the performance of a random guess with an AUC of 0.694 for predicting future 
AAER’s, providing evidence that the linguistic cues contained within the S-1 filing are predictive 
of whether a firm will manipulate its financial statements in the future. When comparing the six 
measures using only the information available within the S-1, fraud_cues has the highest AUC, 
showing prior measures of fraud prediction cannot be used in place of my measure in the S-1 
setting, and that developing a distinct measure in this setting is incrementally informative. I also 
show that qualitative information outperforms quantitative information in the pre-fraud period. 
These results provide evidence of the predictive benefit of using linguistic cues instead of 
contextual, raw financial, or financial ratio-based manipulation predictors. When comparing the 
measures using the S-1 information to construct fraud_cues and then updating the other measures 
to include the first misstated 10-K filing, I find fraud_cues continues to outperform the benchmark 
measures at predicting AAERs even without being updated relative to the other measures. This 
suggests the information in pre-fraud disclosures can yield better fraud prediction than the use of 
financial ratios or raw data items.  
To exploit the differences in the time periods of the measures, I consider the incremental 
usefulness of fraud_cues in conjunction with the benchmark prediction measures identified by 
prior literature. The combined results produce an AUC of 0.752. I also combine the measures most 
informative in the pre-fraud period, and produce an AUC of 0.793. The joint analysis results 
suggest combining linguistic cues, content, abnormal disclosure, raw financial data, and financial 
based ratios increases overall predictive ability.  
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Next, as AAER’s are relatively rare, not all the firms identified by fraud_cues as having a 
high likelihood of future fraud will receive one. As such, I consider whether my fraud prediction 
measure has implications for future earnings management and future information asymmetry as 
well. Prior literature finds earnings management contributes to analyst forecast errors, reduces 
shareholder value, is associated with lower returns following economic events, and generally 
misleads stakeholders about the fundamental value of the firm (Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; 
DuCharme et al. 2004; Chou et al. 2006; Healy and Wahlen 1999). Therefore, the ability to predict 
firms that will engage in earnings management enables monitors to preserve not only shareholder 
value but the usefulness and value relevance of financial reporting. Specifically, I examine whether 
fraud_cues identifies firms more likely to engage in earnings management to meet or beat earnings 
targets. I find the firms identified by my measure as exhibiting a greater likelihood of receiving an 
AAER are also more likely to just meet or beat earnings targets, consistent with prior research 
examining earnings management.   
Next, I examine whether an increased likelihood of financial statement fraud is associated 
with higher levels of information asymmetry. As private information is obtained by informed 
traders, the firm will experience lower volume around earnings announcements as liquidity 
investors exit the market, resulting in higher bid-ask spreads (Copeland and Galai 1983). I find my 
measure identifies firms with significantly higher bid-ask spreads and lower trading volume 
around earnings announcements during the 5-year period following the S-1 filing, suggesting these 
firms have lower liquidity (Affleck-Graves et al. 2002; Chae 2005). Collectively these findings 
show that the same textual cues that are associated with future AAERs are also associated with 
both earnings management and information asymmetry measures that result in undesirable 
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outcomes for regulators and capital market participants by reducing value relevance and resulting 
in lower liquidity. 
Additionally, I consider whether my measure has predictive ability over future returns. I 
do not find results, potentially due to the relative rarity of AAER’s subsuming any abnormal 
returns. I consider an alternative measure of fraud, 10(b)-5 lawsuits, that is slightly less rare both 
to examine abnormal returns and assess the robustness of my original measure. When re-
calculating fraud_cues based on the S-1 filings of firms that are named in section 10(b)-5 lawsuits, 
within the 5-year period following the IPO, I find that the measure based on cues again outperforms 
the benchmark measures from prior literature, with an AUC of 0.561. While the predictive power 
of this measure is lower than the AAER counterpart, this measure does have some predictive power 
over abnormal returns. I find that, after constructing yearly portfolios based on linguistic cues, the 
cumulative abnormal return of the lowest fraud-likelihood portfolio is positive and significant. 
This result holds after considering risk factors.  Additionally, I consider whether including a larger 
population of financial statement line items from the S-1 filing improves the predictive accuracy 
of a quantitative fraud prediction model and find that the measure based on fraud_cues continues 
to have higher predictive accuracy.   
This study provides the first evidence that the rich qualitative information in the IPO 
prospectus can be useful for more than just examining underpricing, but also in the prediction of 
(1) future financial statement manipulation, (2) earnings management, and (3) information 
asymmetry. My study contributes to the extant literature at the intersection of both textual analysis 
and financial manipulation prediction. I first extend this literature by documenting that textual 
analysis of the first publicly available, pre-manipulation period, qualitative data can be used to 
predict financial statement manipulation without requiring the use of manipulated financial 
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information. While prior literature suggests firms will commit fraud when there is opportunity, 
motivation, and the pressure to do so, my study suggests a persistent element overlooked by prior 
literature that results in a predictable likelihood measure. 
Second, my study connects the spectrum of financial misconduct activities by training a 
model on AAERs and using it to predict earnings management and other financial misconduct. 
While other studies (Dechow et al. 2011; Bao et al. 2020) have examined the relationship between 
accruals-based earnings management and the likelihood of future AAERs, my study is the first to 
do so using textual analysis, showing that verbal cues are an important avenue for researchers to 
consider. 
 Third, I expand on the burgeoning research using machine learning approaches in the fraud 
prediction literature (Cecchini et al. 2010; Goel et al. 2010; Purda and Skillicorn 2015; Bao et al. 
2020; Bertomeu et al. 2020; Brown et al. 2020). My study extends prior research by using machine 
learning to predict the future likelihood of manipulation and does so using nuanced textual 
disclosures, answering the call from Loughran and McDonald (2016, p.1188) to examine whether 
there are “subtle cues in managements’ [disclosures] that computers can discern better than 
[market participants].”  
Lastly, the assessment of the future likelihood of fraud is of significant interest to capital 
market participants, creditors, governmental regulators, and researchers. The ability to predict the 
likelihood of future fraud, up to five years prior to the actual manipulation, should be of significant 
interest as it is in alignment with regulatory goals and investors’ incentives. The SEC has already 
begun to use text-based tools to detect anomalies in firm disclosures, therefore this research is in 




2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 A large literature examines whether it is possible to detect financial statement manipulation 
using quantitative information. Given the lack of any formal theoretical predictors of fraud, Green 
and Choi (1997) were of the first to employ an algorithmic approach, ad-hoc selecting five 
financial ratios and using an NN model to predict fraud using a hold-out sample. While this model 
achieved a 74 percent accuracy rate for detecting manipulation, the analysis performed was within-
sample, and the NN approach did not provide insight into which ratios were the most useful and 
where the cutoffs occurred. After the passage of Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 99 in 
2002, external auditors were tasked with providing reasonable assurance that financial statements 
are free from material fraud. As such, auditors developed fraud checklists and began to consider 
the theoretical underpinnings of fraudulent reporting. Early literature finds the financial items on 
the audit fraud checklist are useful in detecting fraud but rely on proprietary data sources and are 
therefore not generalizable (Bell and Carcello 2000; Asare and Wright 2004).  
 With both generalizability and increased theorization as primary concerns, Dechow et al. 
(2011) formally theorize why certain financial statement information is associated with 
manipulation, such as the misstatement of receivables to improve sales growth. In their study, 
Dechow et al. (2011) utilize not only financial statement ratios but other market-related, off-
balance sheet, and nonfinancial variables. Their final measure, f-score, is widely regarded as one 
of the most powerful fraud prediction tools and achieved an accuracy rating of 71.53 percent when 
tested on a sample of 29,159 firm-years. However, Dechow et al. (2011) achieve a significant 
amount of their overall statistical power from including firm-years post manipulation in their 
sample to provide insight into how financial statements revert post-manipulation.  Overall, the 
Dechow et al. (2011) study provided a richer understanding of the financial statement accounts 
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and other metrics most likely to be affected by fraud, but f-score is limited in its ability to predict 
this fraud out-of-sample. 
In order to predict fraud out of sample, algorithmic approaches became more common. 
Concurrent with the Dechow et al. (2011) study, Cecchini et al. (2010) utilize a financial kernel 
(FK) by examining restated financial accounts to extract the line items most commonly restated. 
This approach to create FK results in the use of many of the same line items found within the f-
score ratios. Cecchini et al. (2010) utilize a support vector machine learning algorithm that 
separates fraud firms from non-fraud firms based on changes to the FK measures over time. 
Bertomeu et al. (2020) analyze whether accounting variables or complimentary audit variables 
better capture whether a firm misstates earnings. They find the array of accounting variables 
studied has the greatest importance on the detection of serial misstatements and consider whether 
their measure has look-ahead predictive power over a 1-year and 2-year horizon. Bertomeu et al. 
(2020) find lower predictive power in their look-ahead tests, and it is important to note that they 
do not exclude serial misstatement firms in their sample, thus their measure is not capturing the 
pre-manipulation period exclusively. Bao et al. (2020) employ an ensemble learning method but 
depart from both the benchmark f-score and FK measures by choosing to not make ex-ante 
predictions involving financial ratios and instead use raw accounting data. Bao et al. (2020) 
construct a list of raw financial variables based on the raw data items used to construct the ratios 
used by Cecchini et al. (2010) and Dechow et al. (2011), resulting in a twenty-eight-variable 
measure, RUSBoost. When RUSBoost predicts fraud out-of-sample, it outperforms both 
benchmark measures. Despite the consideration of raw data items, Bao et al. (2020) find 
significantly less predictive power when considering all the raw data items available for the firms 
examined, showing that theoretical guidance is important in fraud prediction. 
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One potential concern with relying on quantitative information is the difficulty in 
identifying a comprehensive list of attributes of financial manipulation. Another concern is that 
while relying on certain line items found in misstatements is useful in predicting financial 
manipulation, there are a wide variety of financial attributes available to perpetrators, enabling 
them to potentially conceal fraud in  new ways (Cecchini et al. 2010; Allee et al. 2021). As such, 
a separate but related stream of literature examines the ways in which qualitative information, such 
as textual disclosures, can be used to detect financial manipulation. Textual disclosures have been 
found to contain incrementally informative content to quantitative disclosures in a variety of 
mediums. More complex annual reports have been shown to indicate poorer performing firms and 
lead to greater analyst dispersion and lower forecast accuracy (Li 2008, Lehavy et al. 2011). Press 
releases with a more optimistic tone overall are associated with a higher return on assets (Davis et 
al. 2012), while press releases with a more optimistic tone relative to their accompanying MD&A 
are indicative of managers attempting to strategically increase market perceptions when reporting 
bad news (Davis and Tama-Sweet 2012). In conference calls, tone dispersion and managerial 
affective states have shown to contain incremental information about future firm performance 
(Allee and DeAngelis 2015; Mayew and Venkatachalam 2012). Collectively, this research 
suggests there is nuanced information content within qualitative disclosure, and that this 
information concerns not just what is said, but how it is said. 
With respect to fraud, recent literature has taken advantage of the incremental 
informativeness of qualitative disclosure content to compare manipulation-period and non-
manipulation period disclosure to identify a new list of fraud attributes. Cecchini et al. (2010) find 
that classifying financial text into dictionaries enables a VSM measure to detect manipulated 
statements from non-manipulated statements 75 percent of the time. Firms that manipulate their 
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financial statements are also shown to use fewer general references, lower non-extreme positive 
tone, and more optimistic language (Rogers et al. 2011; Larcker and Zakolyukina 2012). While 
these papers hypothesized ex-ante which linguistic attributes perpetrators might employ, Purda 
and Skillicorn (2015) utilize an SVM model to construct word lists and find these lists outperform 
pre-defined measures, a key difference from the collective findings of the quantitative literature 
stream.  
The thematic content of qualitative disclosure is also informative, as fraud firms under-
report detail and overstate performance and growth potential (Hoberg and Lewis 2017; Brown et 
al. 2020).4 The Brown et al. (2020) study provides evidence that thematic content is informative 
relative to the other commonly studied features used within textual analysis. Their study examines 
proxies for length, complexity, variation, readability, tense, word choice, and emphasis to 
ultimately conclude that “what” managers say is more important than how they say it. Lastly, in 
computer science, syntactic stylometry, or the study of linguistic patterns independent of context, 
has been useful in detecting deceptive practices (Zhou et al. 2003; Feng et al. 2012). In their 2010 
study, Goel et al. (2010) use stylometry to detect manipulation in misstated financial statements, 
using not just the features examined by Brown et al. (2020) but also a deeper linguistic analysis 
using markers such as pronouns, prepositions, and conjunctions to achieve an 89.51 percent 
accuracy rating when detecting misconduct.  
While existing research has made progress using qualitative disclosure to identify a series 
of theoretical, thematic, and stylistic attributes associated with and predictive of fraud, I consider 
a fundamentally different research question by examining pre-fraud disclosure as opposed to 
fraud-period disclosure. Literature that examines financial statement fraud documents an 
 
4 Thematic content is defined following Brown et al. (2020) as the topics identified within qualitative disclosure. 
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association with weaknesses in firms’ internal governance and monitoring that creates an 
opportunity to commit fraud (Beasley1996; Beasley et al. 2000). Following that intuition, certain 
firms who may otherwise decide to manipulate their financial statements are unable to as they are 
constrained by monitors. As such, there exist three firm subgroups: a) fraud firms, b) non-fraud 
firms, and c) would be fraud-firms subject to prohibitive constraints. Groups b) and c) are 
systematically different, with group c) having a greater likelihood of committing future fraud than 
group b) upon experiencing a change in the level of monitoring. In order to examine whether these 
systematic differences exist, I focus on linguistic patterns in the pre-fraud period for two primary 
reasons. First, stylometric differences have been identified as one of the strongest fraud predictors 
and second, quantitative information is more likely to be heavily scrutinized by external monitors 
and is primarily backward looking (Bonsall et al. 2014). Therefore, I focus on qualitative linguistic 
cues and state my hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: There are linguistic cues within qualitative disclosures issued prior 
to the occurrence of fraud that improve the prediction of fraud, relative to 
quantitative features and content-based information. 
I next examine whether linguistic cues from disclosures issued prior to the occurrence of 
fraud improve the prediction of future earnings management. Earnings management is the process 
of altering financial reporting to either mislead investors about actual underlying performance or 
to favorably influence contractual outcomes that rely on financial reporting (Healy and Wahlen 
1999; Schipper 1989; Lo 2008). Earnings management therefore has the potential to erode the 
value relevance of financial information and result in disclosure that is not relevant nor faithfully 
represented, a violation of FASB Concept Statement No. 8. Earnings management also impacts 
shareholder value as firms that manipulate earnings are more likely to be sued (DuCharme et al. 
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2006). Additionally, earnings management can result in higher analyst forecast errors as analysts 
are not able to consistently identify firms that manage earnings (Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; 
Burghstahler and Eames 2006). Lastly, firms that manage earnings around security offerings have 
lower one-year aftermarket returns than their counterparts and firms that manage earnings around 
mergers have higher post-merger announcement lawsuits (Chou et al. 2006; Teoh et al. 1998).  
Prior literature examines and finds proxies for earnings management are significant 
predictors of financial statement fraud (Beneish 1999; Dechow et al. 2011). Building on this logic, 
I consider the relationship between linguistic cues within qualitative disclosure and future earnings 
management. If earnings management is also the result of systematic differences between firms, I 
expect to find that firms more likely to commit fraud are also more likely to engage in higher levels 
of earnings management. I state my hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: There are linguistic cues within qualitative disclosures issued prior to 
the occurrence of fraud that are associated with higher levels of future earnings 
management. 
Next, I consider the relationship between future fraud and future information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry exists when insiders have a deeper insight into the firm’s information 
environment than outsiders, creating an information disparity (Aboody and Lev 2000). Information 
asymmetry has negative implications for capital markets as it is negatively correlated with trading 
volume as liquidity traders exit the market (Foster and Viswanathan 1990). As information 
asymmetry spreads to the secondary market, larger traders will hold fewer shares, increasing the 
risk for non-institutional investors and lowering the equilibrium price of the firm (Lambert et al. 
2011). Lastly, this decrease in liquidity trading volume can amplify adverse selection, leading to 
higher bid-ask spreads (Copeland and Galai 1983). Therefore, information asymmetry can be seen 
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as a type of corporate misconduct, potentially resulting in lower liquidity. Specifically, I consider 
whether linguistic cues issued prior to egregious misconduct (i.e. fraud) can be used to predict 
firms with more asymmetric information. I state my hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: There are linguistic cues within qualitative disclosures issued prior to 
the occurrence of fraud that are associated with higher levels of future information 
asymmetry. 
Lastly, a key component of the theory underlying Hypothesis 1 is that timelier prediction 
of misconduct is useful, and thus incrementally informative to existing measures used to detect it. 
While the identification of firms in the pre-fraud period based on linguistic cues allows for more 
targeted monitoring, this identification also has potential implications for asset pricing. If investors 
fail to price the nuanced linguistic cues contained within the firm filings, or the lack thereof, they 
will potentially misprice the stock of firms that commit fraud and not realize the benefits of firms 
that are not likely to commit future fraud. That is, if and when a fraud is revealed, this mispricing 
will correct, and the investors will experience predictable losses. As such, a portfolio trading 
strategy exploiting this mispricing should result in positive abnormal stock returns. Conversely, 
Fama and French (1993) find that it is possible to explain the variation in the cross-sectional stock 
returns using a set of risk factors. As such, it is possible that any pricing anomaly identified through 
the aforementioned portfolio strategy might be better explained as a lack of an adjustment for risk. 
If investors are in fact pricing the likelihood of future fraud, the required rate of return would be 
higher as the likelihood of future fraud increases. As such, a portfolio trading strategy would have 
to account for risk to show the abnormal returns generated are the result of mispricing. Therefore, 
I state my hypothesis as follows: 
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Hypothesis 4: A risk-adjusted trading strategy based on the likelihood of future 
financial manipulation generates positive abnormal stock returns. 
 
3. Setting, Data, Sample Selection, and Methodology 
3.1 IPO Setting 
In order to test my hypotheses, it is necessary to utilize a setting where firms are subject to 
a high level of external monitoring and scrutiny. For this reason, I focus on disclosure during the 
IPO process. The IPO setting is uniquely appropriate for several reasons. First, the IPO process is 
a time when firms must balance disclosing less negative information to not leave money on the 
table (Skinner 1994; Healy and Palepu 2001; Ritter and Welch 2002) with increasing disclosure 
to avoid litigation risk (Hanley and Hoberg 2012). This creates a dichotomy as the IPO event and 
its related disclosures are a time when information asymmetry between firms and investors is 
especially high (Loughran and McDonald 2013) but the IPO firm is also heavily monitored by 
management and underwriters concerned with potential litigation.   
Second, the S-1 filing issued during the IPO process is the first publicly available firm 
disclosure, serving as the earliest possible fraud predictor. The IPO prospectus must only contain 
three years of audited income statements and two years of audited balance sheets (with only two 
years required for emerging growth companies). This lack of a long history of tangible information 
has resulted in the consideration of qualitative textual disclosures when examining underpricing 
(Hanley and Hoberg 2010; Hanley and Hoberg 2012; Loughran and McDonald 2013).  
Third, it has been suggested by the popular press that IPO firms have been using 
charismatic words and phrases to avoid focusing on financial information (Galloway 2019). If 
firms have incentives to manipulate disclosures to increase investment, yet are limited by monitors 
and litigation risk, how will they react when they are past this heavily scrutinized firm event? As 
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such, the IPO setting provides a unique opportunity to evaluate whether firms respond in 
discernable ways that provide predictive evidence of their future propensity to manipulate financial 
statements when they are not monitored as heavily as they are during the IPO process. 
3.2 Data and Sample Selection 
I begin my sample selection with the original S-1 filing for the 5,048 completed U.S. IPO’s 
from 1996-2015 taken from the intersection of the Audit Analytics and Compustat databases. I 
start with 1996 as it is the first full year after Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, which codified “loss causation”, requiring the plaintiff to carry the burden of 
proving loss causation for all actions arising from section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and fundamentally 
changed the definition of fraud. The sample period ends in 2015 to allow for a five-year post-IPO 
financial manipulation window.5 To remain consistent with the prior literature examining the 
textual components of S-1 filings, I eliminate American Depositary Receipts, unit issues, Real 
Estate Investment Trusts, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, and financial industry firms 
with SIC codes between 6000-6999. I use a web algorithm to extract the MD&A section and 
eliminate any observations without this section, which results in 2,454 completed U.S. firms 
remaining the final sample.  
I next match the sample based on CIK to classify an S-1 filing as belonging to a firm that 
will commit fraud. In order to identify frauds, I utilize the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Release (AAER) database, used by Dechow et al. (2011). The AAER database is compiled by the 
University of Southern California and provides details on firms subject to SEC enforcement 
actions. To remain in my sample, the AAER must not name the IPO year and the period named 
 
5 During my sample period, the JOBS Act was signed into law (April 5, 2012). The Act allows Emerging Growth 
Companies, firms with less than $1 billion in annual revenues, to file draft IPO registration statements. As these 
statements are required to be filed publicly within 21 days before a road show, the JOBS Act does not interfere with 
the sample selection of this study. 
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during the AAER must not exceed the 5-year window post IPO-filing. This is done to concentrate 
analyses on firms in the period just after they complete their IPO, as this period is potentially less 
heavily monitored. Additionally, firms are most likely to have a similar organizational team in 
place as during the S-1 process. Research finds 35% of IPO firm CEOs leave within the first five 
years indicating that the majority of my sample retains its CEO throughout the entire sample period 
(Mitsuhashi and Welbourne 1999). As all AAER observations list the dates of the impacted 
financial statements, I remove any observations where the S-1 filing was listed as an impacted 
statement, to focus exclusively on pre-fraud qualitative content.  
As shown in Table 1, there were 68 IPO-firms that received an AAER within the 5-year 
post IPO period between 1995-2015. The overall percentage of fraud is 3 percent. Also shown in 
Table 1, the percentage of firms that received AAERs has been decreasing over time. This 
downward trend in AAERs during the sample period is consistent with statements from SEC 
officials that post-financial crisis resources were diverted away from accounting fraud 
investigations in order to focus on financial crisis cases such as those involving Ponzi schemes 
(Ceresney 2013), and not necessarily that fraud has been decreasing over time. A limitation of this 
study is that there are potential fraud firms during the sample period that were not identified by 
the SEC, which would result in an overstated Type 1 error rate. 
3.3 Linguistic Cues Measure 
My measure to classify the qualitative properties of financial statement manipulation 
within the S-1 filing, fraud_cues, is based on a text classification approach. Text classification is 
a classic component of Natural Language Processing (NLP), that involves classifying text into tags 
(e.g. Fraud/ Non-Fraud). I choose to utilize a support vector machine learning algorithm as this 
measure has been widely used within accounting literature and has been shown to outperform both 
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logistic regressions and naïve-bayes approaches (Cecchini et al. 2010; Goel et al. 2010; Purda and 
Skillicorn 2015). Consistent with prior literature, the first step in machine learning based textual 
analysis is vectorization, where the S-1 text is transformed into its numerical representation based 
on feature extraction (i.e. word choice, frequency, and co-location). My study departs from this 
prior literature through the use of an advanced deep learning architectural layer during the feature 
extraction step, to determine which linguistic attributes are most relevant to fraudulent firms based 
on the data from within the MD&A section of the S-1 filing. Collectively, extant literature suggests 
tone, word choice, grammatical voice, and distribution of parts of speech to assist in the detection 
of fraud (Goel et al. 2010, Rogers et al. 2011, Larcker and Zakolyukina 2012, Purda and Skillicorn 
2015. The proprietary deep learning architectural layer I use allows me to simultaneously examine 
all of these linguistic properties. The proprietary nature is a result of using a commercially 
available machine learning product, MonkeyLearn, shown by extant literature to out-perform other 
web-based service models (Basmmi et al. 2020). MonkeyLearn is a web-based service model that 
enables a user to upload a set of training text for analysis and performs vectorization and machine 
learning analysis. The model can then process a set of test data to output classification as well as 
accuracy statistics.  
I utilize a standard support vector machine (SVM) model that uses a resampling procedure 
to fit the model, consistent with prior literature (Witten and Frank 2005, Hastie, Tibshirani, and 
Friedman 2003, Larcker and Zakolyuikna 2012). The resampling procedure splits the training data 
into four subsets of equal size to perform cross-validation and then trains the final model using the 
entire dataset. The cross-validation measure allows the model to produce accuracy metrics on its 
within-sample predictive ability that are an average across subsets, reducing the potential bias from 
using just one training session. I train the model with a training sample of 1996-2000, with 2001-
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2015 serving as a hold-out sample. Table 1 reports summary statistics related to training and testing 
samples. The training sample represents approximately 80% of the AAER firms while the testing 
sample represents about 20%.  This was done in order to ensure the machine learning algorithm 
had a sufficient amount of data to train the AAER model.6 Relying on a hold-out sample enables 
fraud_cues to serve as an out-of-sample prediction score as opposed to a detection score. 
To address the class imbalance problem caused by the relative rarity of fraud, I perform an 
under-sampling technique following prior literature (Perols 2011; Perols et al. 2017). When 
uncorrected for, relative rarity results in an algorithm biased toward the majority class (Maloof 
2003). To avoid this bias, I use Multi-Subset Observation Undersampling (OU) which keeps the 
total number of fraud observations in my training sample constant and randomly selects an equal 
number of non-fraud observations without replacement, following Perols et al. (2017).   
Table 2 presents baseline statistics related to within-sample fraud detection. As discussed 
previously, the SVM classifier was trained using four-fold cross-validation. These statistics 
indicate that SVM performed better without adjusting for stop words in my test period, which 
appears reasonable considering the measure is constructed to take all words into account when 
creating the cues-based measure. The table presents four detailed accuracy results: (1) accuracy, 
(2) F1 score, (3) precision, and (4) recall. Accuracy represents the percentage of firms that were 
predicted with the correct tag while F1 score is the combination of precision and recall. Precision 
and recall are specific to the Fraud and Non-Fraud samples. For the Fraud sample, the percentages 
are calculated as follows: precision = (the number of true Fraud firms/ number of firms guessed as 
Fraud firms) and recall = (the number of true Fraud firms/ number of overall Fraud firms). The 
 
6 I replicate this process using a 10-year training period and a 10-year test period and note that accuracy metrics on 




results are in alignment with those found in Goel et al. (2010) with the exception of the recall rate 
of 74% significantly outperforming their recall rate of 41.5%. Alternatively stated, this means that 
of the total number of Fraud firms in the training population, my measure predicted 74% correctly. 
The comparability of these statistics suggests my SVM model is achieving high within-sample 
accuracy and performing consistently with models from prior literature. Additional analyses 
related to measure validation are reported in Section 5. 
3.4 Benchmark Measures 
I consider three benchmark measures from prior literature to provide context for my 
measure, as well as two measures constructed specifically for the IPO period. First, I consider three 
measures designed to predict financial statement fraud using fraud period disclosure. Despite the 
lack of direct comparability, it is important to examine whether fraud_cues is identifying pre-fraud 
attributes that are different from pre-existing fraud period attributes. 
3.4.1 f-score 
The Dechow et al. (2011) f-score measure is considered the benchmark fraud prediction 
measure and serves as the starting point for comparing the out-of-sample performance of my 
measure. I calculate the f-score for the firms in my sample following measure 1 of table 9 of 
Dechow et al. (2011): 
AAER = B0 + B1RSST Accrualsi,t + B2Change in Receivablesi,t  
+ B3Change in Inventoryi,t + B4% Soft Assetsi,t + B5Change in Cash Salesi,t  
+ B6Change in ROAi,t + B7Actual issuancei,t + B8BTMi,t + e.         (1) 
Where t is the IPO year. All variables are defined as in Dechow et al. (2011), and where AAER is 
a variable equal to one if the observation is an IPO firm that receives an AAER within 5-years of 
the IPO date for the IPO date sample and zero otherwise. I first estimate equation (2) for the testing 
window of 1996 to 2000 and use the estimated coefficients to construct f-score for my out-of-
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sample period of 2001 to 2015. I note that I omit two variables found in Dechow et al. (2011), 
lagged market-adjusted stock returns and the existence of operating leases. There are no lagged 
market-adjusted stock returns available at the S-1 period as the firm was not publicly traded, and 
the inclusion of the operating leases variable drastically reduces the sample size.7 If firms begin to 
manipulate their financial statement information in advance of committing fraud, it is possible the 
f-score will have predictive power in the pre-fraud period. In order to compare my pre-fraud 
disclosure measure with the fraud-period detection ability of the f-score, I re-estimate equation (1) 
with AAER equal to one if the observation year is the first year covered by the AAER and is equal 
to zero otherwise for a sample of firm-years beginning with the IPO year and ending with the first 
year covered by the AAER.  
3.4.2 RUSBoost 
For my second benchmark measure I construct RUSBoost, following Bao et al. (2020), by 
applying an ensemble learning algorithm to raw financial data items. I begin with the list of 28 raw 
financial data items selected by Bao et al. (2020). A full list of these variables can be found in 
Panel A of Table 3A, where RUSBoost is indicated in the Benchmark column. I use the same 
training and test year conventions as Bao et al. (2020), using all years prior to the IPO-year as 
training data with a 2-year gap (1996 to 1999 as training for 2001, 1996 to 2000 for 2002, etc.). I 
follow the same methodology as Bao et al. (2020), using an ensemble learning method (as opposed 
to SVM) combined with a random under-sampling (RUS) technique to address the problem of 
class imbalance.8 I calculate RUSBoost using the financial information within the S-1 to remain 
consistent with fraud_cues. Similar to the f-score, if firms begin to manipulate financial statements 
 
7 Inferences remain quantitatively and qualitatively similar when operating leases are included. 
8 In un-tabulated analyses, I recompute RUSBoost using an SVM model and the same training and testing period as 
fraud_cues, inferences reported in Section 4 remain unchanged. 
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line items in advance of committing fraud, or if these line items are systematically different 
between the two pre-fraud groups (b) and (c), I expect RUSBoost to have out-of-sample predictive 
power. I also re-calculate RUSBoost using the first financial statement containing the fraud, to 
better conform to the original setting the measure was developed for.  
3.4.3 Abnormal Disclosure 
 For the third benchmark measure I calculate abnormal disclosure, AbDisc, following 
Hoberg and Lewis 2017. This study was the first to consider whether the thematic content of 
manipulated disclosures differed from non-manipulated disclosures. They find firms engaging in 
fraud produce abnormal disclosure relative to their peers, after controlling for size, age, fixed 
effects, and controls based on quantitative fraud models. I follow the cosine similarity approach 
seen in models (1) through (4) of Hoberg and Lewis (2017) to replicate a measure of cosine 
similarity between fraudulent and non-fraudulent S-1 filing MD&A sections. I calculate the 
measure using the base vocabulary from 1996 to 2000 to fit the model, reserving 2001 to 2015 as 
the out of sample test period. If future fraud firms produce abnormal disclosure during the IPO 
period, I expect AbDisc to have predictive power in the pre-fraud period. I re-estimate the measure 
using all annual filings starting with the S-1 through the first fraudulent filing to assess the out-of-
sample predictive power of AbDisc in the fraud-period.  
3.4.4 Topic 
For the fourth benchmark measure I use IPO_topic, following Brown et al. (2020). 
IPO_topic is a measure based on the narrative content within the S-1 filings that builds off the 
measure used in Hoberg and Lewis (2017). In order to use IPO_topic as a comparison to linguistic 
cues, I perform LDA topic analysis on the MD&A section of the S-1 filings over rolling 5-year 
windows following the original study. This methodology accounts for changes in the relevant 
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topics over time. Consistent with the methodology employed in Brown et al. (2020), I select 31 
topics from each window. After selecting the topics, I follow models (1) and (2) from page 260 of 
Brown et al. (2020) to apply the estimated coefficients from a regression of AAER on vectors of 
topic for each window of my test sample. The construction of IPO_topic is distinct from the 
measures discussed thus far as it is the first to be re-thought for the IPO period. While the S-1 has 
been used to construct the other benchmark measures, the construction of IPO_topic allows me to 
specifically test whether pre-fraud thematic content differs between future-fraud and future non-
fraud firms. The comparison of IPO_topic and fraud_cues allows for the direct comparison of 
whether pre-fraud topic content or pre-fraud linguistic attributes are better able to predict future 
fraud. 
3.4.5 IPO f-score 
 While f-score and RUSBoost are quantitative measures useful in establishing whether pre-
fraud disclosure content is different from fraud period disclosure content, these measures are not 
directly comparable to fraud_cues. In order to examine whether quantitative information is useful 
in predicting future-fraud, I select a set of quantitative variables that I hypothesize to be associated 
with future-fraud. 
AAER = B0 + B1RSST Accrualsi,t + B2Change in Receivablesi,t  
+ B3Change in Inventoryi,t + B4% Soft Assetsi,t + B5Startup,t  
+ B6VCi,t  + B7Agei,t + B8Hot_IPOi,t + e.              (2) 
 
 I include RSST accruals, Change in Receivables, and Change in Inventory as higher accruals have 
been documented in the pre-manipulation period (Dechow et al. 2013). I include % Soft Assets as 
firms with greater net operating assets have more accounting flexibility, making it easier for these 
firms to commit future fraud (Barton and Simko 2002). The next group of variables proxy for the 
monitoring environment surrounding the IPO. Startup is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
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annualized pre-IPO revenues are less than $1 million while VC is an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the firm has venture capital backing per the SDC database (Bochkay et al. 2018). Compared to 
other investor types, venture capitalists have more expertise in funding start-ups and impose high 
monitoring. As such, I would anticipate a negative coefficient on B5 and B6. Age is the number of 
years between the founding date and the IPO date (Loughran and Ritter 2004). The longer a firm 
exists, the less need for external monitoring, thus I anticipate a positive coefficient on B7. Lastly, 
Hot_IPO is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm went public during a period when the inverse 
of the industry median IPO book-building period falls in the top two quintiles (Wang et al. 2010). 
A shorter book-building period indicates a hot IPO market, and more optimism in the firm’s 
prospects. As such, I would expect firms in a hot IPO market have less monitoring as the market 
is more confident in their ability to generate positive returns, and therefore expect a positive 
coefficient on B8. In order to compute IPO_f-score, I first estimate equation (2) for the testing 
window of 1996 to 2000 and use the estimated coefficients to construct f-score for my out-of-
sample period of 2001 to 2015. 
3.5 Receiver Operating Characteristics 
 Following prior research, I use the area under the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) 
curve to evaluate the out-of-sample prediction ability of fraud_cues (Larcker and Zakolyukina 
2012; Bao et al. 2020; Brown et al. 2020). The ROC curve plots the two-class true positive rate 
against the false positive rate at various threshold settings. The area under the curve (AUC) reports 
the area under the ROC curve, which is the probability that the measure will rank a manipulation 
observation correctly. With no known information, the probability of correctly assigning an 
observation as a misconduct is 0.5. The AUC report values of 0 – 1.0 depending on the accuracy 
of the measure. Following prior literature, I calculate the AUCs using pooled data for all test years.  
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3.6 Earnings Management 
 For my market-based tests of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, I utilize the test sample from 
Table 1 of 1,406 firms as I require every firm to have a fraud_cues score. For every firm in my 
sample, I collect annual filings starting with the first post-IPO filing and ending 5 years following 
the IPO date to remain consistent with my AAER convention. For each firm-year, I merge my 
sample with the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database to collect return variables, 
the Compustat database to collect firm specific variables, and analyst variables from I/B/E/S. I 
first empirically test Hypothesis 2 using the following linear regression where the unit of 
observation is firm-year: 
MBE(inv)i,t =  β0 + β1Fraud_cuesi + β2Sizei,t-1 + β3BMi,t-1 + β4Levi,t-1  
+ β5AnalystCounti,t + β6AnalyistDispi,t + εi,t                                                                              (3) 
 
Where MBE(inv) is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm failed to meet or beat (missed) analyst targets, 
and zero otherwise. As Hypothesis 2 posits firms identified as having a higher likelihood of future 
fraud will engage in higher levels of earnings management, I expect a negative coefficient on β1.  
I include Size, the log of market equity value, to control for size. I include the book-to-market ratio, 
BM as growth affects investors’ response to earnings performance. Additionally, I include 
leverage, Lev, which is measured as long-term debt relative to assets, to control for a firms’ 
proximity to debt default. Lastly, I include AnalystCount, calculated as the number of analysts 
issuing forecasts, and AnalystDisp, a measure of analyst dispersion. I run pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions with one dimensional clustering by firm, including year fixed effects. 
To examine whether the firms are managing earnings to beat earnings forecasts, I perform a second 
analysis where I limit my sample to only those firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts. I estimate 
the following model: 
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MBEi,t =  β0 + β1Fraud_cuesi + β2Sizei,t-1 + β3BMi,t-1 + β4Levi,t-1 
+ β5AnalystCounti,t + β6AnalyistDispi,t + εi,t                                                                                   (4) 
 
Where all variables are defined above and MBE is a continuous variable measured as the difference 
between the actual EPS and the median EPS forecast for values of zero or greater. Higher values 
of MBE indicate that the firm beat earnings targets by a larger magnitude, therefore if firms are 
managing earnings to narrowly meet or beat analyst targets’ I expect to find a negative coefficient 
on β1. Both my definition of MBE(inv) and the refinement to create MBE for values greater and 
equal to zero are in alignment with the prior literature that examines earnings management (Doyle 
et al. 2013).  
3.7 Information Asymmetry 
 For my market-based tests of Hypothesis 3, I consider whether firms with a higher 
likelihood of future fraud have higher future information asymmetry by examining the bid-ask 
spreads around earnings announcements (Glosten and Harris 1988; Coller and Yohn 1997). In 
order to examine this relationship, I estimate the following model: 
AbSpreadi,t =  β0 + β1Fraud_cuesi + β2Sizei,t-1 + β3BMi,t-1 + β4Levi,t-1  
+ β5AnalystCounti,t + β6AnalyistDispi,t + εi,t                                                                               (5) 
 
Where  AbSpread is calculated as the average daily bid-ask spread over trading days 0 through 1 
relative to the earnings announcement date minus the average daily bid-ask spread over the trading 
days [-41, -11], following Chi and Shanthikumar (2017), and all remaining variables are as 
previously defined. I calculate the average daily bid-ask spreads as the difference between the 
quoted offer price and the quoted bid price, divided by the midpoint and multiplied by 100 (Bushee 
2010). If firms more likely to manipulate in the future produce future disclosures with a higher 
degree of information asymmetry, I expect a positive coefficient on β1. Additionally, I examine 
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whether there is abnormal trading volume around the earnings announcement by estimating the 
following model: 
AbVoli,t =  β0 + β1Fraud_cuesi + β2Sizei,t-1 + β3BMi,t-1 + β4Levi,t-1  
+ β5AnalystCounti,t + β6AnalyistDispi,t + εi,t                                                                              (6)                                    
 
Where all variables except AbVol are defined above and AbVol is calculated as the stock’s average 
daily trading volume over days 0,1 relative to the earnings announcement minus the average over 
the trading days [-41, -11]. Daily trading volume is calculated as the log of the product of the 
closing price and the number of shares traded. If firms that are likely to engage in future fraud also 
reveal more pre-announcement private information, there will be less new information revealed 
during the earnings announcement window and lower relative volume, therefore I predict a 
negative coefficient on β1. 
3.8 Market Returns 
 To test Hypothesis 4, I examine whether fraud_cues is associated with future excess 
returns. In this specification, I estimate cross-sectional regressions of excess returns on the 
likelihood that a firm will commit future fraud and other firm-level characteristics: 
Returni,t =  β0 + β1Fraud_cuesi + β2Sizei,t-1 + β3BMi,t-1 + εi,t                                                  (7) 
Where all variables are defined above and Return is calculated both yearly and cumulatively over 
the five years following the IPO. 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Results 
  Table 3, Panels A and C present summary statistics of the financial variables for the firm-
years in my sample at both the IPO date and fraud date respectively. Panel B details the differences 
between the Fraud and Non-Fraud observations at the IPO date. With respect to the financial ratios 
used to construct f-score, firms that will eventually receive AAERs have greater changes in 
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receivables and a larger percentage of soft assets at the time of their S-1, but the remaining 
variables are generally consistent between the two samples. The percentage of soft assets is 
noteworthy as the variable represents firms with more accounting flexibility, suggesting these 
firms have the ability to report positive earnings surprises using this line item (Barton and Simko 
2002). Additionally, firms that commit future fraud are less likely to have venture capital backing, 
consistent with the discussion of VC’s acting as strong monitors. Lastly, firms in hot IPO markets 
are more likely to commit future fraud, consistent with my ex-ante expectations. As most of the 
financial variables examined were originally conceived with the fraud-period in mind, it appears 
reasonable that several of the variables are not statistically different between the two samples. 
When examining the 28 raw variables used in the RUSBoost measure, there are no statistically 
significant differences between the fraud and non-fraud sample. When examining the firms at their 
fraud date in Panel D, more of the variables exhibit statistically significant differences between the 
two groups. This appears reasonable as this is the time-period in which the variables were 
originally hypothesized to detect manipulated reporting.  
 I examine Pearson correlations between the variables, un-tabulated for brevity. 
Correlations significant at the 10 percent level are in bold. The overall lack of significant 
correlations between the financial variables and the occurrence of future fraud suggests historical 
qualitative measures of manipulated financial reporting are less informative in the pre-fraud 
period. The significant relationship between fraud_cues and RSST_accruals, change in inventory, 
percentage of soft assets, and change in return on assets suggests the cues measure is identifying 
similar firms as the Dechow et al. (2011) f-score measure. However, as the f-score was not 
originally intended to apply to the pre-manipulation period I do not offer a discussion on the sign 
of the correlation. Fraud_cues is also significantly correlated with several of the raw financial 
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variables used to calculate RUSBoost, but as many of the raw variables are not correlated with the 
misconduct cues measures it suggests the cues measure is also picking up different attributes of 
manipulation. 
4.2 Tests of H1 
4.2.1 Benchmark Comparison – IPO Period 
In table 4, I present out-of-sample tests of the predictive role of fraud_cues. The AUC 
statistic of 0.694 is greater than a random classification measure. This result indicates that 
linguistic cues within the S-1 filing are predictive of future fraud. Next, I present results comparing 
fraud_cues to the benchmark measures (f-score, RUSBoost, and AbDisc) to examine whether 
financial variables identified by prior literature are also useful in predicting future-fraud. P-values 
reported for the benchmark measures are based on a two-tailed t-test between each measure and 
fraud_cues. Panel A represents AUC statistics for measures fitted with information from the S-1 
filing. The AUC indicates that the f-score, RUSBoost, and AbDisc measures are not statistically 
greater than a random guess (AUC = 0.50). This result shows provides evidence that conventional 
measures used to predict fraud using fraud-period disclosure are less informative in the pre-fraud 
period, necessitating the use of new measures such as fraud_cues. 
The AUC for IPO_topic reflects a predictive gain of 8 percent over a random measure.  
Despite this predictive gain, fraud_cues is statistically better at predicting future fraud (p < 0.05). 
Lastly, the AUC for IPO_f-score is 0.652, which makes it the second-best predictor of future fraud 
following fraud_cues which remains weakly statistically superior (p < 0.09). The finding that 
linguistic cues exhibit incremental predictive power over quantitative variables and topical content 
supports Hypothesis 1. In their best topic measure designed specifically for their setting, Brown et 
al. 2020 achieve a predictive accuracy AUC of 0.680, while Bao et al. 2020 achieve a predictive 
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accuracy AUC of 0.725 for their best RUSBoost measure. Therefore, with an AUC of 0.694, 
fraud_cues is in alignment with prior literature in terms of predictive ability, with the key 
distinction of identifying fraud up to 5 years in advance. Additionally, I find that my measure of 
fraud_cues predicts 11 out of the 13 (84 percent) future frauds correctly, which suggests the results 
of my measure are economically significant. 
4.2.2 Benchmark Comparison – Misconduct Period 
Panel B of Table 4 presents out-of-sample tests of the predictive role of the benchmark 
measures at the fraud date. The AUC statistic for fraud_cues remains unchanged as this variable 
is not updated. The AUC for f-score is lower than at the IPO date, potentially attributable to both 
high Type 1 and Type 2 errors. AbDisc remains statistically indistinguishable from a random guess 
in both panels. RUSBoost performs significantly better when calculated at the fraud date, with an 
AUC of 0.601. As such, my next analyses examine whether the predictive power of fraud_cues 
combined with the predictive power of the benchmark measures are incrementally predictive over 
the stand-alone measures.  
4.2.3 Joint Predictability 
Table 5, Panel A, presents the logistic regression of the determinants of future fraud using 
the fraud measures suggested by prior literature. In column (1), I present the results with just the 
f-score measure, column (2) includes the addition of my fraud_cues measure, column (3) further 
includes RUSBoost, column (4) adds IPO_topic, column (5) adds AbDisc, and column (6) is a 
combination of all four measures. In column (2), fraud_cues remains weakly significant, (p < 
0.10), when included in a model with f-score and significant, (p < 0.05), when included with all 
other measures in column (5). The table also presents AUC statistics for all columns. Adding 
fraud_cues to the f-score measure results in a predictive gain of 28.9 percent. The inclusion of 
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RUSBoost, column (3), only represents a predictive gain of seven percent while topic, column (4), 
produces a gain of 23 percent, and AbDisc, column (5), does not represent a predictive gain. 
Combining all four measures results in an AUC of 75.2%, which suggests fraud_cues combined 
with pre-existing measures achieves a higher prediction rate.  
Table 5, Panel B, presents the logistic regression using the three measures designed for the 
pre-fraud period. Topical content was originally hypothesized to change with fraudulent 
disclosure, but was refit using topics from the S-1 filing, therefore this measure is hybrid and 
included in both Panel A and Panel B. Column (1) presents the results with the IPO_f-score 
measure, Column (2) includes fraud_cues, Column (3) adds IPO_topic, and Column (4) combines 
the three measures. Of the four specifications, a combined fraud_cues and IPO_f-score measure 
has the greatest predictive power, with an AUC of 0.793. These results suggest that a combination 
of linguistic cues and quantitative information increases overall predictive ability, with no gains 
from the inclusion of topical content.  
4.3 Tests of H2 
 The results from tests of Hypothesis 1 imply that linguistic cues taken from the S-1 filing 
are useful in the prediction of future financial fraud. As the instances of fraud remain relatively 
rare, Hypothesis 2 extends the usefulness of the measure further to investigate whether fraud_cues 
is associated with future earnings management. Table 6 presents the results from estimating 
Equations (3) and (4). Consistent with my predictions, the coefficient on fraud_cues is negative 
and highly statistically significant (p < .01) for both equations. Table 6, Column (1), shows that 
firms with a higher likelihood of receiving an AAER are less likely to miss analyst earnings targets. 
Table 6, Column (2) examines only firms that meet or beat analyst earnings targets and shows that 
firms with a higher likelihood of receiving an AAER are more likely to just meet or beat earnings 
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targets.9 These results show that a model trained to predict out-of-sample future financial fraud 
also identifies firms more likely to engage in future earnings management. This is important for 
two reasons. First, this finding strengthens the link between earnings management and fraud and 
second, this finding shows how fraud_cues has broader usefulness that extends beyond just the 
prediction of fraud. 
4.4 Tests of H3 
 Hypothesis 3 posits that firms more likely to receive a future AAER are also more likely 
to engage in other forms of disclosure-based misconduct, which will result in increased 
information asymmetry. Table 7 presents the results from estimating Equations (5) and (6). In 
Table 7, Column (1), the coefficient on fraud_cues is positive and highly statistically significant 
(p < .01). As fraud_cues increases, the bid-ask spread increases, suggesting higher levels of 
information asymmetry between investors. This finding is consistent with that of Keung et al. 
(2010) who document that earnings management is associated with higher mean average spreads 
and greater information asymmetry. In Table 7, Column (2), the coefficient on fraud_cues is 
negative and highly statistically significant (p < .01). As fraud_cues increases, abnormal trading 
volume decreases, which suggests a weaker response to the earnings announcement driven by pre-
announcement private information leakage. Collectively, the findings in Table (7) and Table (8) 
show that fraud_cues can be used to identify a wide array of financial reporting misconduct and 
that there is an association between the different types of misconduct. These findings also show 
that the identification of future fraud is especially important for regulators and all capital market 
participants as fraud_cues identifies an array of future misconduct. 
 
 
9 My results are robust to an alternative dependent variable, JMBE, calculated as a truncated sample of firms with 
earnings surprises between -4 cents per share and +3 cents per share, following Doyle et al. 2013. 
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4.5 Tests of H4 
 Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of Equation (7) with yearly returns as the dependent 
variable. With the exception of year three, the coefficients on fraud cues are not statistically 
different from zero. Panel B of Table 8 presents the results using cumulative returns as the 
dependent variable, consisting only of firms that have returns every year during 5-year period. 
Collectively, these results suggest that fraud_cues is not useful in predicting future returns. This 
finding is consistent with Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012), who do not find significant excess 
returns for their AAER sample. I believe that the lack of results is due do the rarity of AAER’s, 
making it hard to detect any potential mispricing correction by the market. As linguistic cues in 
the pre-fraud period are unable to predict future returns, I do not have cause to further examine 
whether the relationship can be explained by underlying risk factors. 
5. Supplemental Analysis 
In this section, I report several additional analyses, including an alternative measure of 
future fraud, validation of the original measure, and an additional benchmark measure based on an 
exhaustive set of financial statement line items. 
5.1 Lawsuit Sample 
To check the robustness of my results, I re-estimate my results based on whether a lawsuit 
under Section 10(b)-5 was brought against the firm. Many studies have used lawsuits as a proxy 
for the presence of corporate financial fraud (Srinivasan 2005, Peng and Roell 2008, Wang et al. 
2010). I focus on Section 10(b)-5 lawsuits as opposed to Section 11 lawsuits as Section 10(b)-5 
lawsuits require proof of intent and therefore have a higher threshold. I obtain the population of 
10(b)-5 lawsuits from the Stanford Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC) and require the same time-
period constraints as the AAER dataset. I next hand collect information from the SCAC to classify 
35 
 
each lawsuit as “settled”, “dismissed”, or “ongoing”. To remain in my sample, the lawsuit must be 
tagged as either “settled” or “ongoing”. All lawsuits labeled as “dismissed” are excluded. Table 
10 reports the distribution of 10(b)-5 lawsuits. There are 313 IPO-firms that were sued under 
Section 10(b)-5 within the 5-year post IPO period between 1995-2015.  
Table 10 reports the out-of-sample performance for the 10(b)-5 lawsuit sample. At the IPO 
date, the area under the ROC curve for the fraud_cues measure based on lawsuits is 0.561. For the 
lawsuit sample, the AUC’s for f-score, AbDisc, IPO_topic, and IPO_f-score are 0.452, 0.313, 
0.348, and 0.485 respectively. None of these prediction measures outperform a random guess of 
0.50. With an AUC of 0.552, RUSBoost is the only other model that performs better than a random 
guess. At the fraud date, RUSBoost outperforms fraud_cues with an AUC 0f 0.691. This appears 
reasonable as RUSBoost was originally conceived to predict fraud using the manipulated financial 
statements. Despite lower predictive accuracy relative to the AAER measure, this alternative 
specification based on 10(b)-5 lawsuits shows that it is possible to adapt the cues-based measure 
to another sample, providing additional evidence that there is incrementally informative content 
found using lexical cues to predict future manipulation. 
Table 9 documents the larger percentage of lawsuit frauds compared with AAER frauds. I 
re-estimate Equation (7) to take advantage of this increased fraud sample. Panel A of Table 11 
presents the results with yearly returns as the dependent variable. Similar to the results reported 
for the measure based on AAERs, the coefficients on fraud_cues in columns (1) through (5) are 
not statistically different from zero. Panel B of Table 11 presents the results with cumulative 
returns as the dependent variable. The coefficients on fraud_cues are negative and significant (p < 
0.01) for the cumulative five-year period following the IPO. These results show that linguistic 
fraud cues are associated with returns. 
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Next, I investigate whether the predictive power of fraud_cues can be explained by 
underlying risk factors. I estimate time-series regressions of excess returns on Fama-French (1993) 
factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor: 
ExRett=β0+β1(Mkt-RF)t + β2SMBt+ β3HMLt+β4WMLt+et                                  (8) 
I first sort firms into decile portfolios each year based on their fraud_cues score, rebalancing 
yearly. I then calculate value-weighted returns of each portfolio and subtract T-bill rates to get the 
excess returns.10 I run three-factor plus momentum model time-series regressions by fraud cues 
deciles and present the results in Table 12. Confirming my earlier findings, the main conclusion 
from Table 12 is that the predictive ability of lawsuit fraud_cues remains after adjusting for the 
factors. The result is driven by the low portfolio, firms that I predict are less likely to receive 10(b)-
5 lawsuits. It is possible that firms receive 10(b)-5 lawsuits from shareholders based on declining 
performance as suggested by Hanley and Hoberg (2012), and fraud_cues has predictive ability in 
identifying these firms. I also note that a trading strategy based on fraud_cues would only generate 
economically meaningful positive abnormal returns from a long strategy and not a hedge strategy, 
as the abnormal returns for the high portfolio are not statistically significant. 
5.2 Measure Validation 
 While prior literature has used advanced computational models to perform textual analysis 
extraction, there is a wide array of literature that relies on bag-of-words lists.11 I investigate 
whether my original fraud_cues measure based on AAER’s is associated with word lists used by 
prior literature. Specifically, I use the Loughran-McDonald word lists from their 2013 study of 
Initial Public Offerings as it is one of the most widely used. The results of this analysis are un-
 
10 For robustness, I calculate the equally-weighted returns of the portfolios and find results consistent with the value-
weighted portfolio. 
11 See Loughran and McDonald (2016) for a review of the literature. 
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tabulated for brevity. There are no significant associations except that weak modal words are 
negative and significantly associated with fraud_cues (p < 0.01). Weak modal words are 
hypothesized to make it more difficult for investors to assess the value of a firm. This study makes 
no predictions as to whether a firm would be more or less likely to use ambiguous language in the 
pre-fraud period. This finding and lack of theoretical interpretation does however shed light upon 
the difficulty of forming ex-ante predictions based on word lists in a pre-fraud setting. Overall, 
this result lends support for the decision to employ an SVM approach based on deep vectorization 
instead of a logistic approach based on pre-determined word lists. 
 I next examine whether fraud_cues is associated with underpricing. Prior literature 
suggests that riskier IPOs will be underpriced more than their less-risky counterparts, referred to 
as the changing risk composition hypothesis (Ritter 1984). If IPO period risk is associated with 
future-fraud risk, I expect to find a significant relationship between fraud_cues and underpricing. 
I calculate underpricing, fdret, following Ritter (1984) and use the offer price from the Securities 
Data Company (SDC) and the first closing price from CRSP. The results of this analysis are un-
tabulated for brevity. I do not find a significant relationship between my linguistic cues measure 
and underpricing, further providing evidence that future-fraud is an independent construct and that 
my study is not related to the literature that examines IPO underpricing. 
5.3 Additional Raw Data 
Next, I consider whether adding more of the raw data items available within the S-1 filing 
will help improve the predictive accuracy of a quantitative model. There are two primary reasons 
for performing this analysis. First, there are a lack of formal theoretical predictors of fraud and 
second, none of the existing fraud prediction literature considers which theoretical predictors in 
the pre-fraud period are the most informative. In order to perform the most complete analysis of 
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which quantitative variables are associated with future fraud, I include all available raw financial 
statement items for the S-1 filing available within Compustat. Table 13 reports the results. The 
value of the AUC is lower for both the AAER sample and the lawsuit sample. These results suggest 
that adding more quantitative variables does not improve prediction accuracy relative to lexical 
cues and echoes the concerns of prior literature that the lack of a long history of tangible 
information makes it difficult to use the quantitative information within the S-1 filing (Loughran 
and McDonald 2013). As such, the results support the decision to focus on qualitative information 
to construct the fraud prediction measure I use in my study. 
6. Conclusion 
  Financial statement fraud can result in significant losses to shareholder value for the fraud 
firms as well as threaten the efficiency of capital markets by impairing overall trust. The current 
literature examining fraud prediction has focused on using the actual manipulated financial 
statements without considering the content of pre-fraud financial statements as a standalone 
information source. In this study I employ a machine learning algorithm to examine whether there 
is information content within pre-manipulation disclosures that provides predictive evidence on 
whether a firm will manipulate their financial statements and receive an AAER in a future period.  
I develop a unique measure, fraud_cues, by using a machine learning algorithm to detect 
subtle lexical cues within the earliest pre-fraud disclosure, the S-1 filing. I perform out-of-sample 
analyses using historical data as a training sample to predict future manipulation and achieve an 
accuracy rating of 0.694 in my primary analysis, out-performing benchmark models for predicting 
manipulation in the IPO setting. My standalone linguistic cues measure with an AUC of 0.694 
when predicting AAERs is not only the highest performing measure, but I achieve this predictive 
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ability up to five years in advance of the fraud, enabling regulatory monitors such as the SEC the 
ability to better allocate their limited resources.   
  Further, I find that when combining my measure with quantitative measures, I am able to 
achieve an AUC of 0.793 for predicting AAERs out-of-sample. Additionally, I provide evidence 
that lexical cues used to predict the future receipt of an AAER are also associated with both higher 
future earnings management and higher future information asymmetry. Firms with a higher 
fraud_cues score are more likely to manage earnings to just meet or beat analyst forecasts and to 
experience increased information asymmetry around earnings announcements within the first 5-
years following the IPO. Earnings management and information asymmetry can erode the value 
relevance of financial reporting and lower liquidity by forcing those investors without access to 
private information out of the market. 
 I find that my inferences are robust to using another definition of fraud, 10(b)-5 filings, and 
that the measure based on these lawsuits has some predictive power over future abnormal returns. 
When conducting a portfolio analysis, I find firms identified by fraud_cues as least likely to 
commit future fraud generate positive abnormal returns, even after adjusting for common risk 
proxies. 
This is the first study to consider whether it is possible to utilize information prior to the 
occurrence of fraud as an independent predictor, and successfully predicts 84 percent of the future 
AAERs received by firms that went through an initial public offering after 2000. As such, the 
results of this study are not only economically valuable in detecting future cases of financial 
manipulation, but in providing a timelier measure of detection. These findings are relevant to a 
growing accounting literature that uses the data from public filings in fraud prediction. 
40 
 
Additionally, these findings should be of interest to regulators and capital market participants as 




Abarbanell, Jeffery, and Reuven Lehavy. 2003. “Biased Forecasts or Biased Earnings? The Role 
of Reported Earnings in Explaining Apparent Bias and over/Underreaction in Analysts’ 
Earnings Forecasts.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 36 (1–3): 105–46.  
 
Aboody, David, and Baruch Lev. 2000. “Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains.” The 
Journal of Finance 55 (6): 2747–66.  
 
Affleck-Graves, John, Carolyn M. Callahan, and Niranjan Chipalkatti. 2002. “Earnings 
Predictability, Information Asymmetry, and Market Liquidity.” Journal of Accounting 
Research 40 (3): 561–83.  
 
Allee, Kristian D., Bok Baik, and Yongoh Roh. 2021. “Detecting Financial Misreporting with 
Real Production Activity.” Working Paper.  
 
Allee, Kristian D., and Matthew D. Deangelis. 2015. “The Structure of Voluntary Disclosure 
Narratives: Evidence from Tone Dispersion: The Structure of Voluntary Disclosure 
Narratives.” Journal of Accounting Research 53 (2): 241–74.  
 
American. 2016. “Five Financial Heroes and Villains: How a Master of Science in Accounting at 
American University Can Turn You into a Fiscal Superstar.” American University (blog). 




Amiram, Dan, Zahn Bozanic, James D. Cox, Quentin Dupont, Jonathan M. Karpoff, and Richard 
Sloan. 2018. “Financial Reporting Fraud and Other Forms of Misconduct: A 
Multidisciplinary Review of the Literature.” Review of Accounting Studies 23 (2): 732–
83.  
 
Arnold, Tom, Raymond P.H. Fishe, and David North. 2010. “The Effects of Ambiguous 
Information on Initial and Subsequent IPO Returns.” Financial Management 39 (4): 
1497–1519. 
 
Asare, Stephen K., and Arnold M. Wright. 2004. “The Effectiveness of Alternative Risk 
Assessment and Program Planning Tools in a Fraud Setting*.” Contemporary Accounting 
Research 21 (2): 325–52.  
 
Bao, Yang, Bin Ke, Bin Li, Y. Julia Yu, and Jie Zhang. 2020. “Detecting Accounting Fraud in 
Publicly Traded U.S. Firms Using a Machine Learning Approach.” Journal of 




Barton, Jan, and Paul J. Simko. 2002. “The Balance Sheet as an Earnings Management 
Constraint.” The Accounting Review 77 (s-1): 1–27.  
 
Basmmi, Ain Balqis Md Nor, Shahliza Abd Halim, and Nor Azizah Saadon. 2020. “Comparison 
of Web Services for Sentiment Analysis in Social Networking Sites.” IOP Conference 
Series: Materials Science and Engineering 884 (July): 012063.  
 
Bauguess, Scott W. 2018. “The Role of Machine Readability in an AI World.” Presented at the 
SEC Keynote Address, Financial Information Management Conference 2018, May 3. 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-bauguess-050318. 
 
Beasley, Mark S. 1996. “An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director 
Composition and Financial Statement Fraud.” The Accounting Review 71(4): 443-465. 
 
Beasley, Mark S., Joseph V. Carcello, Dana R. Hermanson, and Paul D. Lapides. 2000. 
“Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of Industry Traits and Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms.” Accounting Horizons. 14(4): 441-454. 
 
Bell, Timothy B., and Joseph V. Carcello. 2000. “A Decision Aid for Assessing the Likelihood 
of Fraudulent Financial Reporting.” AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 19 (1): 
169–84.  
 
Beneish, Messod D. 1997. “Detecting GAAP Violation: Implications for Assessing Earnings 
Management among Firms with Extreme Financial Performance.” Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy 16 (3): 271–309.  
 
Bertomeu, Jeremy, Edwige Cheynel, Eric Floyd, and Wenqiang Pan. 2020. “Using Machine 
Learning to Detect Misstatements.” Review of Accounting Studies, October.  
 
Bochkay, Khrystyna, Roman Chychyla, Srini Sankaraguruswamy, and Michael Willenborg. 
2018. “Management Disclosures of Going Concern Uncertainties: The Case of Initial 
Public Offerings.” The Accounting Review 96(3): 29-59. 
 
Bonsall, S. B., Z. Bozanic, and K. J. Merkley. 2014. “What Do Forward and Backward-Looking 
Narratives Add to the Informativeness of Earnings Press Releases?” Working Paper. 
 
Brau, James C., James Cicon, and Grant McQueen. 2016. “Soft Strategic Information and IPO 
Underpricing.” Journal of Behavioral Finance 17 (1): 1–17.  
 
Brown, Nerissa C., Richard M. Crowley, and W. Brooke Elliott. 2020. “What Are You Saying? 





Burgstahler, David, and Michael Eames. 2006. “Management of Earnings and Analysts’ 
Forecasts to Achieve Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises.” Journal of Business 
Finance Accounting 33 (5–6): 633–52.  
 
Bushee, Brian J., Ian D. Gow, and Daniel J. Taylor. 2018. “Linguistic Complexity in Firm 
Disclosures: Obfuscation or Information?: LINGUISTIC COMPLEXITY IN FIRM 
DISCLOSURES.” Journal of Accounting Research 56 (1): 85–121.  
 
Carhart, Mark M. 1997. “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance.” The Journal of Finance 
52 (1): 57–82.  
 
Cecchini, Mark, Haldun Aytug, Gary J. Koehler, and Praveen Pathak. 2010. “Detecting 
Management Fraud in Public Companies.” Management Science 56 (7): 1146–60.  
 
Ceresney, Andrew. 2013. “Financial Reporting and Accounting Fraud.” Speech at American 
Law Institute Continuing Legal Education. Washington, DC. 
 
Chae, Joon. 2005. “Trading Volume, Information Asymmetry, and Timing Information.” The 
Journal of Finance 60 (1): 413–42.  
Chi, Sabrina, and Devin Shanthikumar. 2017. “Local Bias in Google Search and the Market 
Response around Earnings Announcements.” The Accounting Review 92(4): 115-143. 
 
Chou, De-Wai, Michael Gombola, and Feng-Ying Liu. 2006. “Earnings Management and Stock 
Performance of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts.” The Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 41 (2): 407–38. 
 
Coller, Maribeth and Teri Yohn. 1997. “Management Forecasts and Information Asymmetry: An 
Examination of Bid-Ask Spreads.” Journal of Accounting Research 35(2): 181-191. 
 
Copeland, Thomas E., and Dan Galai. 1983. “Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread.” The 
Journal of Finance 38 (5): 1457–69.  
 
Davis, Angela K., Jeremy M. Piger, and Lisa M. Sedor. 2012. “Beyond the Numbers: Measuring 
the Information Content of Earnings Press Release Language*: Content of Earnings Press 
Release Language.” Contemporary Accounting Research 29 (3): 845–68 
 
Davis, Angela K., and Isho Tama-Sweet. 2012. “Managers’ Use of Language Across Alternative 
Disclosure Outlets: Earnings Press Releases versus MD&A*: Language in Earnings Press 
Releases vs. MD&A.” Contemporary Accounting Research 29 (3): 804–37.  
 
Dechow, Patricia M., Weili Ge, Chad R. Larson, and Richard G. Sloan. 2011. “Predicting 
Material Accounting Misstatements*: Predicting Material Accounting Misstatements.” 
Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (1): 17–82.  
44 
 
Doyle, Jeffrey, Jared Jennings, and Mark Soliman. 2013. “Do managers define non-GAAP 
earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 56: 40-
56. 
 
Drake, Philip D., and Michael R. Vetsuypens. 1993. “IPO Underpricing and Insurance against 
Legal Liability.” Financial Management 22 (1): 64.  
 
DuCharme, Larry L, Paul H Malatesta, and Stephan E Sefcik. 2004. “Earnings Management, 
Stock Issues, and Shareholder Lawsuits.” Journal of Financial Economics 71 (1): 27–49.  
 
Eaglesham, Jean. 2013. “Accounting Fraud Targeted.” The Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2013. 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324125504578509241215284044. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. 1993. “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on 
Stocks and Bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics 33 (1): 3–56.  
 
Feng, Song, Ritwik Banerjee, and Yejin Choi. 2012. “Syntactic Stylometry for Deception 
Detection.” Presented at the 50th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational 
Linguistics, Republic of Korea. https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/P12-2034.pdf. 
 
Ferris, Stephen P., (Grace) Qing Hao, and (Stella) Min-Yu Liao. 2013. “The Effect of Issuer 
Conservatism on IPO Pricing and Performance*.” Review of Finance 17 (3): 993–1027.  
 
Foster, F. Douglas, and S. Viswanathan. 1990. “A Theory of the Interday Variations in Volume, 
Variance, and Trading Costs in Securities Markets.” Review of Financial Studies 3 (4): 
593–624.  
 
Galloway, Scott. 2019. “Yogababble.” No Mercy/ No Malice (blog). September 27, 2019. 
profgalloway.com/yogababble. 
 
Gande, Amar, and Craig M. Lewis. 2009. “Shareholder-Initiated Class Action Lawsuits: 
Shareholder Wealth Effects and Industry Spillovers.” Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 44 (4): 823–50.  
 
Glosten, L. and L. Harris. 1988. “Estimating the components of the Bid-ask spread.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 21: 123-142. 
 
Goel, Sunita, Jagdish Gangolly, Sue R. Faerman, and Ozlem Uzuner. 2010. “Can Linguistic 
Predictors Detect Fraudulent Financial Filings?” Journal of Emerging Technologies in 
Accounting 7 (1): 25–46.  
 
Green, Brian P., and Jae H. Choi. 1997. “Assessing the Risk of Management Fraud Through 
Neural Network Technology.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 16 (1): 14–28. 
45 
 
Guo, Yanming, Yu Liu, Ard Oerlemans, Songyang Lao, Song Wu, and Michael S. Lew. 2016. 
“Deep Learning for Visual Understanding: A Review.” Neurocomputing 187 (April): 27–
48.  
 
Hanley, Kathleen Weiss, and Gerard Hoberg. 2010. “The Information Content of IPO 
Prospectuses.” Review of Financial Studies 23 (7): 2821–64.  
———. 2012. “Litigation Risk, Strategic Disclosure and the Underpricing of Initial Public 
Offerings.” Journal of Financial Economics 103 (2): 235–54.  
 
Hastie, T., R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman. 2003. The Elements of Statistical Learning: Data 
Mining, Inference, and Prediction. Corrected. New York: Springer-Verlang. 
 
Healy, Paul M, and Krishna G Palepu. 2001. “Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, 
and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature.” Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 31 (1–3): 405–40.  
 
Healy, Paul M., and James M. Wahlen. 1999. “A Review of the Earnings Management Literature 
and Its Implications for Standard Setting.” Accounting Horizons 13 (4): 365–83.  
 
Hoberg, Gerard, and Craig Lewis. 2017. “Do Fraudulent Firms Produce Abnormal Disclosure?” 
Journal of Corporate Finance 43 (April): 58–85.  
 
Hughes, Patricia J., and Anjan V. Thakor. 1992. “Litigation Risk, Intermediation, and the 
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings.” Review of Financial Studies 5 (4): 709–42.  
 
Karpoff, Jonathan M., D. Scott Lee, and Gerald S. Martin. 2008. “The Cost to Firms of Cooking 
the Books.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 43 (3): 581–611.  
 
Keung, Edmund, Zhi‐Xing Lin, and Michael Shih. 2010. “Does the Stock Market See a Zero or 
Small Positive Earnings Surprise as a Red Flag?” Journal of Accounting Research 48 (1): 
105–36.  
 
Lambert, Richard A., Christian Leuz, and Robert E. Verrecchia. 2012. “Information Asymmetry, 
Information Precision, and the Cost of Capital*.” Review of Finance 16 (1): 1–29.  
 
Larcker, David F., and Anastasia A. Zakolyukina. 2012. “Detecting Deceptive Discussions in 
Conference Calls: Detecting Deceptive Discussions in Conference Calls.” Journal of 
Accounting Research 50 (2): 495–540.  
 
Lehavy, Reuven, Feng Li, and Kenneth Merkley. 2011. “The Effect of Annual Report 
Readability on Analyst Following and the Properties of Their Earnings Forecasts.” The 




Li, Feng. 2008. “Annual Report Readability, Current Earnings, and Earnings Persistence.” 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 45 (2–3): 221–47.  
 
Ling, Wang, Lin Chu-Cheng, Yulia Tsvetkov, Silvio Amir, Ramon Astudillo, Chris Dyer, Alan 
Black, and Isabel Trancoso. 2015. “Not All Contexts Are Created Equal: Better Word 
Representations with Variable Attention.” The 2015 Conference on Empirical Methods in 
Natural Language Processing, 1367–72. 
 
Lo, Kin. 2008. “Earnings Management and Earnings Quality.” Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 45(2-3): 350-357. 
 
Loughran, Tim, and Bill McDonald. 2013. “IPO First-Day Returns, Offer Price Revisions, 
Volatility, and Form S-1 Language.” Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2): 307–26.  
 
Loughran, Tim, and Bill Mcdonald. 2016. “Textual Analysis in Accounting and Finance: A 
Survey: TEXTUAL ANALYSIS IN ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE.” Journal of 
Accounting Research 54 (4): 1187–1230.  
 
Loughran, Tim, and Jay Ritter. 2004. “Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed over Time?” 
Financial Management 33 (3): 5–37. 
 
Lowry, Michelle, and Susan Shu. 2002. “Litigation Risk and IPO Underpricing.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 65 (3): 309–35.  
 
Maloof, Marcus. 2003. “Learning When Data Sets Are Imbalanced and When Costs Are 
Unequal and Unknown.” Presented at the Learning from Imbalanced Data Sets II, 
Department of Computer Science, Georgetown University. 
 
Mayew, William J., and Mohan Venkatachalam. 2012. “The Power of Voice: Managerial 
Affective States and Future Firm Performance.” The Journal of Finance 67 (1): 1–43.  
 
Mitsuhashi, Hitoshi, and Theresa Welbourne. 1999. “Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Tenure in 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) Firms: An Event History Analysis of the Determinants of 
Turnover.” CAHRS Working Paper #99-01, Cornell University, . 
 
Palmrose, Zoe-Vonna, Vernon J. Richardson, and Susan Scholz. 2004. “Determinants of Market 
Reactions to Restatement Announcements.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 37 
(1): 59–89.  





Perols, Johan. 2011. “Financial Statement Fraud Detection: An Analysis of Statistical and 
Machine Learning Algorithms.” AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 30 (2): 19–
50.  
 
Perols, Johan L., Robert M. Bowen, Carsten Zimmermann, and Basamba Samba. 2017. “Finding 
Needles in a Haystack: Using Data Analytics to Improve Fraud Prediction.” The 
Accounting Review 92 (2): 221–45.  
 
Purda, Lynnette, and David Skillicorn. 2015. “Accounting Variables, Deception, and a Bag of 
Words: Assessing the Tools of Fraud Detection.” Contemporary Accounting Research 32 
(3): 1193–1223.  
 
Ramesh, Bharath, Cheng Xiang, and Tong Heng Lee. 2015. “Shape Classification Using 
Invariant Features and Contextual Information in the Bag-of-Words Model.” Pattern 
Recognition 48 (3): 894–906.  
 
Ritter, Jay R., and Ivo Welch. 2002. “A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations.” The 
Journal of Finance 57 (4): 1795–1828.  
 
Rogers, Jonathan L., Andrew Van Buskirk, and Sarah L. C. Zechman. 2011. “Disclosure Tone 
and Shareholder Litigation.” The Accounting Review 86 (6): 2155–83.  
 
Schipper, Katherine. 1989. “Commentary on Earnings Management.” Accounting Horizons 3 
(4): 91–102. 
 
Skinner, Douglas J. 1994. “Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News.” Journal of Accounting 
Research 32 (1): 38.  
 
Srinivasan, Suraj. 2005. “Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: 
Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members.” Journal of 
Accounting Research 43(2): 291-334. 
 
Stoughton, Neal M., and Josef Zechner, 1998.“IPO-mechanisms, monitoring and ownership 
structure, Journal of Financial Economics.” 49: 45-77. 
 
Teoh, Siew Hong, Ivo Welch, and T.J. Wong. 1998. “Earnings Management and the Long-Run 
Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings.” The Journal of Finance 53 (6): 1935–
74.  
 
Wang, Tracy Yue, Andrew Winton, and Xioyun Yu. 2010. “Corporate Fraud and Business 




Witten, I., and E. Frank. 2005. Data Mining: Practical Machine Learning Tools and Techniques. 
2nd ed. Morgan Kaufmann Series in Data Management Systems. Morgan Kaufmann. 
 
Zhou, L., D.P. Twitchell, Tiantian Qin, J.K. Burgoon, and J.F. Nunamaker. 2003. “An 
Exploratory Study into Deception Detection in Text-Based Computer-Mediated 
Communication.” In 36th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 











































Table 1: Distribution of IPOs and IPO AAERs. 
Year IPO AAER % 
1996 105 20 19% 
1997 122 5 4% 
1998 176 6 3% 
1999 358 16 4% 
2000 287 8 3% 
2001 56 2 0% 
2002 50 0 2% 
2003 44 1 1% 
2004 139 2 2% 
2005 123 2 2% 
2006 115 2 1% 
2007 116 1 0% 
2008 18 0 0% 
2009 38 0 1% 
2010 81 1 2% 
2011 86 2 0% 
2012 98 0 0% 
2013 151 0 0% 
2014 180 0 0% 
2015 111 0 0% 
Total 2,454 68 3% 
Percentage 100% 3%  
Training Sample 1,048 55 5% 


















Table 2: The within-sample performance evaluation metrics for the test period 1996-2000. 
This tables presents within-sample performance statistics. (1) Accuracy is the percentage of texts 
that were predicted with the correct tag. (2) F1 Score is the combination of precision and recall 
for all tags. (3) Precision refers to the percentage of texts the classifier correctly predicted. (4) 
Recall refers to the percentage of texts the classifier predicted. 
Features/Dataset Accuracy F1 Score Precision Recall Precision Recall 
AAER (filter stop 
words) 
72% 72% 69% 76% 75% 68% 
AAER (w/o stop 
words) 




































Table 3: Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable N Benchmark Mean S.D. Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max 
Fraud_AAER 1,406  0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Fraud_cues 1,406  -0.20 0.69 -0.1 -0.7 -0.6 0.65 0.98 
RSST accruals 1,406 f-score 0.61 0.67 -0.7 0.09 0.42 1.02 1.92 
Change in 
Receivables 
1,406 f-score 0.03 0.06 -0.1 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.32 
Change in 
Inventory 
1,406 f-score 0.02 0.04 -0.0 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.21 
% Soft Assets 1,406 f-score 0.39 0.29 0.01 0.13 0.33 0.64 0.97 
Change in Cash 
Sales 
1,406 f-score 0.48 1.43 -2.1 0.00 0.17 0.52 9.80 
Change in return 
on assets 
1,406 f-score 0.10 0.34 -0.6 -0.0 0.00 0.12 1.29 
Actual Issuance 1,406 f-score 0.98 0.16 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Book-to-market 1,406 f-score 0.30 0.27 -0.5 0.13 0.26 0.42 1.26 
Startup 1,406 IPO f-score 0.57 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
VC 1,406 IPO f-score 0.50 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Age 1,406 IPO f-score 14.47 18.35 -1.0 4.00 8.00 17.00 93.00 
Hot_IPO 1,406 IPO f-score 0.56 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Current Assets, 
Total 
1,406 RUSBoost 252.37 652.7 0.00 49.67 101 202.6 1126 
Accounts payable, 
trade 
1,406 RUSBoost 53.23 231.5 0.00 2.11 6.57 26.03 5001 
Assets, total 1,406 RUSBoost 895.06 2951 0.00 89.46 189 599.2 5579 
Common/ordinary 
equity, total 
1,406 RUSBoost 255.87 917.5 -82 45.91 102 234.3 2347 
Cash and short-
term equivalents 
1,406 RUSBoost 111.30 330.2 0.00 20.37 6.57 107.2 9626 
Cost of goods 
sold 
1,406 RUSBoost 473.68 1809 0.00 18.69 189 234.3 3979 
Common shares 
outstanding 
1,406 RUSBoost 52.88 114.6 000 17.99 103 107.2 2372 
Debt in current 
liabilities, total 
1,406 RUSBoost 23.36 163.5 0.00 0.00 54.9 234.5 3157 
Long-term debt 
issuance 
1,406 RUSBoost 217.45 1340 -0.1 0.00 54.3 52.01 4257 
Long-term debt, 
total 
1,406 RUSBoost 344.54 1522 0.00 0.00 28.2 5.29 2564 
Depreciation and 
Amortization 






Table 4: The out-of-sample performance evaluation metrics for the test period 2001-2015. 
This table shows fraud prediction models’ performance comparison using the area under the 
receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve (AUC). The ROC is the standard technique used 
to select classifiers. The p-values in parentheses are based on a two-tailed t-test of fraud_cues vs. 
the other model and are therefore not available for fraud_cues. 
Panel A: IPO Date (1) 
Method AAER 
1) fraud_cues 0.694 
2) f-score 0.403  
(0.01) 
3) RUSBoost 0.5204  
(0.05) 
4) AbDisc 0.2951  
(0.00) 
5) IPO_topic 0.587  
(0.05) 
6) IPO_f-score 0.652  
(0.09) 
N 1,406 
Panel B: Misconduct Date  
7) f-score 0.201  
(0.00) 
8) RUSBoost 0.601  
(0.06) 








Table 5: Logistic Regression of the determinants of misconduct at IPO date. This table 
presents the regression coefficients from estimating the likelihood of receiving a future AAER. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed *, **, *** denoted significance at the 
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. The AUC represents the area under the receiver operating 
characteristics (ROC) curve (AUC). 
Panel A       













Fraud_cues  0.860* 
(1.71) 
   1.005** 
(1.99) 
RUSBoost   -0.793 
(-0.93) 
  -0.761 
(-0.91) 

























































































































Pseudo R2 0.118 0.144 0.126 0.160 0.145 0.214 
AUC 0.403 0.692 0.4758 0.6347 0.2951 0.752 
Misconduct 
Observations 











Table 5 (Cont.) 
Panel B     






















































































Pseudo R2 0.132 0.156 0.156 0.138 
AUC 0.652 0.793 0.617 0.763 
Misconduct 
Observations 
13 13 13 13 
Non-Misconduct 
Observations 















Table 6: Earnings management around earnings announcements. This table presents the 
regression coefficients from estimating the likelihood of missing earnings or meeting/beating 
earnings. The t-statistics are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed *, **, *** denoted 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 

























Year FE’s Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.028 0.694 


























Table 7: Information asymmetry around earnings announcements. This table presents the 
regression coefficients from estimating the likelihood of abnormal spread or abnormal volume. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed *, **, *** denoted significance at the 
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 

























Year FE’s Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.000 0.156 


























Table 8: Logistic regression of the ability of fraud_cues to predict future returns. This table 
presents the regression coefficients from estimated abnormal returns measured both yearly 
(Panel A) and cumulatively (Panel B). The t-statistics are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed 
*, **, *** denoted significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 































Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1,254 1,107 997 832 646 
Adj. R2 0.075 0.096 0.084 0.075 0.078 
Panel B RetOne RetTwo RetThree RetFour RetFive 
























Year FEs  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs  646 646 646 646 























Table 9: Distribution of IPOs and IPO Lawsuits. 
Year IPO Lawsuit % 
1996 105 23 22% 
1997 122 14 11% 
1998 176 29 16% 
1999 358 41 11% 
2000 287 22 8% 
2001 56 4 7% 
2002 50 4 8% 
2003 44 3 7% 
2004 139 13 9% 
2005 123 15 12% 
2006 115 11 10% 
2007 116 14 12% 
2008 18 2 11% 
2009 38 8 21% 
2010 81 14 17% 
2011 86 14 16% 
2012 98 11 11% 
2013 151 31 21% 
2014 180 29 16% 
2015 111 11 10% 
Total 2,454 313 13% 
Percentage 100% 13%  
Training Sample 1,048 129 12% 




















Table 10: The out-of-sample performance evaluation metrics for the test period 2001-2015. 
This table shows fraud prediction models’ performance comparison using the area under the 
receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve (AUC). The ROC is the standard technique used 
to select classifiers. The p-values in parentheses are based on a two-tailed t-test of fraud_cues vs. 
the other model and are therefore not available for fraud_cues. 
Panel A: IPO Date (1) 
Method Lawsuit 
1) fraud_cues 0.561 
2) f-score 0.452 
(0.01) 
3) RUSBoost 0.552 
(0.70) 
4) AbDisc 0.313 
(0.00) 
5) IPO_topic 0.348 
(0.01) 
6) IPO_f-score 0.485 
(0.00) 
N 1,406 
Panel B: Misconduct Date (1) 
7) f-score 0.269 
(0.00) 
8) RUSBoost 0.691 
(0.03) 






















Table 11: Logistic regression of the ability of fraud_cues to predict future returns. This 
table presents the regression coefficients from estimated abnormal returns measured both yearly 
(Panel A) and cumulatively (Panel B). The t-statistics are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed 
*, **, *** denoted significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 































Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1,254 1,107 997 832 646 
Adj. R2 0.075 0.098 0.081 0.074 0.079 
Panel B RetOne RetTwo RetThree RetFour RetFive 
























Year FEs  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs  646 646 646 646 























Table 12: Excess returns associated with a fraud_cues based portfolio trading strategy. 
This table presents the regression coefficients from a portfolio strategy based on fraud_cues. The 
t-statistics are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed *, **, *** denoted significance at the 0.1, 
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 


























































































































Table 13: The out-of-sample performance evaluation metrics for the test period 2001-2015. 
This table shows fraud prediction models’ performance comparison using the area under the 
receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve (AUC). The ROC is the standard technique used 
to select classifiers. The p-values in parentheses are based on a two-tailed t-test of fraud_cues vs. 
the other model and are therefore not available for fraud_cues. 
Panel A: IPO Date (1) (2) 
Method AAER Lawsuit 
1) fraud_cues 0.694 0.561 




N 1,406 1,406 
 
 
